

MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT DECISIONS – JUNE 2, 2022**SUPREME COURT - CIVIL CASES****ALTMAN V. STATE****CIVIL - CRIMINAL - FELONY**

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION - JUVENILES - Under Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-151(1)(b), a circuit court may only exercise original jurisdiction over an attempted or committed crime by a child if the act was committed or attempted with a deadly weapon, the deadly weapon was a rifle or shotgun or prohibited from being concealed by Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-1, and the act would be a felony if committed by an adult

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - WEAPONS - AUTOMOBILE - An automobile cannot be carried or concealed, nor is it listed as a weapon prohibited from being concealed under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION - YOUTH COURT - Under Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-159(1), if a minor appears before a court other than youth court, and it is determined jurisdiction is improper before that court, the case should be dismissed without prejudice and all relevant documents transferred to the youth court as well as expunge all permanent records

FACTS

In August 2020, Rayvon Altman, who was seventeen at this time, allegedly drove his automobile into another automobile in an attempt to injure the occupants inside, which included his mother, siblings, and stepfather. Altman was subsequently indicted for four counts of aggravated assault. Altman filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and argued that since he was a minor when the alleged crime occurred, the youth court should have had exclusive jurisdiction over his case. The circuit court denied Altman’s motion, finding that while Altman was a minor at the time the alleged crime occurred, Altman used a motor vehicle, a deadly weapon, to allegedly commit the crime. Altman petitioned for interlocutory appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over a matter involving a minor offender who was charged with using a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon to commit aggravated assault.

HOLDING

Because an automobile was not “a deadly weapon, the carrying of which is prohibited” under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-1(1), the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Altman, who was a minor at the time he was alleged to have committed the offense. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Lauderdale County Circuit Court.

Reversed & Remanded - 2021-IA-00419-SCT (June 2, 2022)

Opinion by Justice Ishee

Hon. Robert Thomas Bailey (Lauderdale County Circuit Court)

James A. Williams for Appellant - Barbara Wakeland Byrd (Att’y Gen. Office) for Appellee

Briefed by [Samuel Taylor Rayburn](#)

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SUPREME COURT - ORDERS

ARRINGTON V. STATE

EN BANC ORDER

ORDER

Therman Arrington filed an Application for Leave to Proceed in Trial Court. Arrington was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced as a habitual offender to serve twenty years without the possibility of parole, which was affirmed on direct appeal in January of 2012. The filing at issue in this order was his fourth post-conviction motion filed since 2012. The Supreme Court found that Arrington's motion was not only barred by time and as a successive writ but also was without merit. In addition, because the Supreme Court had previously warned Arrington that future frivolous filings could result in monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief in forma pauperis, the Supreme Court found that Arrington's current filing was frivolous and that he should be restricted from filing future applications for post-conviction collateral relief related to his conviction and sentence in forma pauperis. Therefore, the Supreme Court denied Arrington's Application for Leave to Proceed in Trial Court.

OBJECTION TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT

Presiding Justice King agreed that Arrington's Application for Leave to Proceed in Trial Court was meritless and should be dismissed. However, he disagreed with restricting Arrington from filing further petitions for post-conviction collateral relief in forma pauperis. He argued that the decision to deny Arrington's filing actions in forma pauperis was a violation of both his state constitutional right to access the courts and his fundamental right to vindicate his constitutional rights. Therefore, rather than violating Arrington's fundamental rights by forbidding access to the courts, he would have only found that his current filing lacked merit.

Denied - 2020-M-00571 (May 25, 2022)

En Banc Order by Justice Chamberlin - Objection to the Order with Separate Written Statement by Presiding Justice King Briefed by [Macy Walters](#)

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MISSISSIPPI COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS – MAY 31, 2022

COURT OF APPEALS - CIVIL CASES

BILOXI DOCK & ICE, LLC V. BACK BAY FUEL & ICE, LLC

CIVIL - CONTRACT

APPELLATE REVIEW - COUNTY COURT - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - In cases where a county court sits as the fact-finder, the appellate courts may not overturn the judgment of the county court if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not manifestly wrong

PROPERTY - UNLAWFUL ENTRY - BURDEN OF PROOF - In unlawful entry and detainer cases, the complaining party bears the burden of proof to establish that the defendant unlawfully withholds possession of the disputed property

FACTS

In 1997, Back Bay Fuel and Ice LLC ("Back Bay") entered into a five-year lease agreement ("Lease") with R.A. Lesso Seafood Inc. ("Lessor") for property located in Biloxi, Mississippi. Back Bay used the property for storing and dispensing

fuel. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina destroyed Back Bay’s diesel fuel tank located on the property. Subsequently, a new owner purchased Back Bay and installed a new fuel tank in the same location as the previous one. In 2019, Lessor entered negotiations to sell the property to Biloxi Dock & Ice LLC (“BDI”). In preparation for the purchase, BDI hired Southern Environmental Management & Specialties (“SEMS”) to conduct environmental testing. During this testing, SEMS discovered that diesel fuel contaminants were in the soil in concentrations in violation of the Mississippi Department of Quality (“MDEQ”) standards. Despite this, BDI purchased the property, and the Lease was assigned to BDI. Following the purchase, SEMS on behalf of BDI entered the property and completed remediation of the environmentally contaminated soil. BDI sent an email to Back Bay informing them that the environmental contamination, as a violation of MDEQ, put them in breach of the Lease and that the fuel tank was located outside the leased area. BDI then filed a complaint against Back Bay for unlawful entry and detainer. Back Bay answered denying it was responsible for the environmental breach and denying that BDI was entitled to relief. The SEMS employee who conducted the tests on the property testified that he could not determine the source of the contamination or how long it had existed. Considering the evidence before it, the county court concluded that there was no proof that Back Bay was responsible for the contaminated soil; therefore, Back Bay was not in default of the Lease. Following, because Back Bay had maintained the fuel tank for twenty years without objection from the Lessor, under the doctrines of adverse possession and equitable estoppel, Back Bay rightfully owned that property. BDI appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the county court erred in finding that Back Bay was not in default of the Lease.

HOLDING

Because the burden of proof was on BDI to establish that Back Bay was in default of the Lease, and because the county court, as the fact finder, had sufficient evidence to conclude that BDI failed to do so, the county court did not err in finding that Back Bay was not in default of the Lease. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Harrison County Circuit Court.

Affirmed - 2021-CA-00701-COA (May 31, 2022)

Opinion by Chief Judge Barnes

Hon. Lisa P. Dodson (Harrison County Circuit Court, Second Judicial Dist.)

Henry Laird & Frederick T. Hoff Jr. for Appellant - Robert Alan Byrd for Appellee

Briefed by [Carter Babaz](#)

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MITCHELL V. MISS. DEP’T OF EMP. SEC.

CIVIL - STATE BOARDS & AGENCIES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - STATE AGENCIES - DECISIONS - Decisions of administrative agencies are upheld as long as they are supported by substantial evidence and absent fraud

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - STATE AGENCIES - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and capable of supporting a reasonable conclusion, or is more than a scintilla of evidence

FACTS

Rico Mitchell was employed by the soil stabilization and asphalt paving company, Geopave LLC (“Geopave”). One morning, Mitchell’s supervisor notified him of a new work assignment that involved riding with a team from the Geopave office in Gulfport to a worksite in Louisiana. Mitchell objected to riding in a van with five other masked employees to Louisiana, stating that he had breathing problems. Mitchell’s supervisor suggested that Mitchell could ride in the van for the first day and then drive his personal vehicle the next day. Additionally, Mitchell’s supervisor suggested that the company could pay for Mitchell’s gas costs. Mitchell rejected the compromise. While Mitchell was leaving the meeting room, his supervisor asked him to stay in order for them to work something out, but Mitchell continued to walk out and left work for the day. The following day Mitchell did not report for work. Subsequently, his employment

was terminated. Mitchell filed for unemployment benefits upon learning of his termination. However, the Mississippi Department of Employment Security determined that Mitchell did not show good cause for voluntarily leaving his employment. Thus, Mitchell was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Mitchell appealed this denial before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Throughout the hearing, Mitchell expressed his confusion about the requirements of unemployment benefits regarding the work-search requirement. Mitchell clarified at the end of the hearing that he did understand the work-search requirement and was now attempting to document his searches. However, the ALJ determined based on this exchange that Mitchell was disqualified from receiving benefits for the week at issue since he left work without good cause and had not complied with the statutory work-search requirement. Mitchell appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board of Review. The Board of Review affirmed the ALJ’s decision to deny Mitchell benefits. Mitchell then appealed to the Jackson County Circuit Court. The circuit court agreed with the ALJ and the Board of Review, finding that Mitchell failed to show good cause for leaving his employment and was disqualified from receiving employment benefits. Mitchell appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the circuit court had substantial evidence to affirm the decision that Mitchell was not able and available for work.

HOLDING

Because Mitchell admitted to the ALJ that he did not satisfy the work-search requirement, the circuit court had substantial evidence to determine that Mitchell failed to complete the work-search requirement. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Jackson County Circuit Court.

Affirmed - 2021-CC-00794-COA (May 31, 2022)

Opinion by Judge McCarty

Hon. Kathy King Jackson (Jackson County Circuit Court)

Pro se for Appellant - Albert B. White for Appellee

Briefed by [Chase Baker](#)

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STAPP V. STAPP

CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES

TRUSTS & ESTATES - INSOLVENCY - PRESERVATION - Courts of equity have inherent power to protect trusts and may order a sale of part of the trust property if such action is necessary for execution of the trust purposes

TRUSTS & ESTATES - INTERPRETATION - INTENTION OF TRUSTOR - A court, in determining whether or not it will authorize a departure from the terms of the trust, will emphasize the ultimate intention of the trustor rather than the interests of the beneficiaries, and the prime consideration is the necessity for the preservation of the estate and not merely the administration of the trust in a way to produce a greater benefit for the beneficiaries

TRUSTS & ESTATES - COST INCURRED - REIMBURSEMENT - When the trustee pays claims for the benefit of the trust estate, which he is authorized by the trust instrument to incur, he may be reimbursed out of the estate

FACTS

Aaron Stapp and his wife Bobbie Stapp created the Stapp Revocable Living Trust and placed certain assets into the trust. Years later, Aaron then created the Aaron Stapp Living Trust and, again, placed certain assets into this trust. A quitclaim deed indicated the farmland at issue was first conveyed by Aaron and Bobbie to Aaron and Bobbie as trustees of the Stapp Revocable Living Trust. The farmland was then conveyed by Aaron as trustee of the Aaron Stapp Living Trust. It appears Bobbie was deceased at the time of this conveyance. After Aaron’s death, his last will and testament was probated and his estate was opened with his only children, Amy Stapp and Troy Stapp, serving as co-executors. Amy and Troy also became trustees of both trusts at some point after their father’s death. The estate closed and Troy

was later removed as a trustee of both trusts, leaving Amy as the sole trustee. Amy was later removed as trustee when attorney John T. Lamar was appointed as trustee by the chancery court. Amy then filed a petition asking the chancery court to divide the corpus of the Aaron Stapp Living Trust or, in the alternative, to make a distribution to the beneficiaries. Troy then filed an answer and counter-petition denying that the relief Amy had requested should be granted. Additionally, he claimed that he should be reimbursed for certain expenses he incurred on behalf of the trust and that Amy should be required to reimburse the trust for her use of trust assets for her own benefit and for expenses the trust had incurred or the income it had lost as a result of Amy's use of trust assets. Troy further argued that the farmland should remain a trust asset. The chancery court entered an order resolving such matters. After this, Troy and Amy both filed motions to amend and or clarify the judgment. After considering the motions, the chancery court then entered an additional order clarifying that all liquid assets shall be divided between the two beneficiaries prior to the auction of the remaining assets of the trust and all additional requests in Amy and Troy's motions were denied. Specifically, the chancellor did not order that the farmland and houses be sold, and they remain assets of the trust. Troy appealed.

ISSUES

Whether the chancery court erred in (1) requiring that all the farm equipment be auctioned; (2) requiring that \$50,000 be maintained in an account for unforeseen expenses, taxes, and insurance; (3) failing to require Amy to reimburse the trust for rent and increased utility costs during her occupancy of the farmhouse, and in allowing Amy to remain living in the farmhouse indefinitely; and (4) failing to require Amy to reimburse the trust for the funds she received from the cattle sales, and in failing to order that Troy be reimbursed for alleged expenses incurred associated with the management of the cattle.

HOLDING

(1) Because Amy and Troy were unable to run the farm and allowed fifteen cows to die, and because the farm had not been profitable since Aaron's death, the chancery court did not err in requiring the farm equipment be auctioned. (2) Because the \$50,000 was maintained for unforeseen expenses and the real property remained in the trust, the chancery court did not err in requiring that the \$50,000 be maintained for unforeseen expenses. (3) Because there was no indication that the farmhouse property was ever intended to or used to generate rental income, because Amy was required to meet certain conditions in order to continue living on the farm, and because Troy was not excluded from enjoying the property as well, the chancery court did not err in failing to require Amy to reimburse the trust for rent or allowing Amy to remain living at the farmhouse. (4) Because it is unclear whether Amy or Troy, when acting as trustees, had any authority granted within the trust instrument to make certain expenditures for which they requested reimbursement or for which they unilaterally reimbursed themselves without consulting the other, and because both parties admitted to reimbursing themselves for expenses they claim they made for the benefit of the farm, the chancery court did not err in failing to require Amy to reimburse the trust for the funds she received from the cattle sales or failing to order that Troy be reimbursed for alleged expenses incurred associated with the management of the cattle. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Panola County Chancery Court.

DISSENT

Judge McCarty argued that the chancery court erred by modifying the trusts without having the actual terms of the trusts or knowing the settlor's intent. He noted that the chancery court was not able to find the factual findings it did without having the documents creating the trust. He further argued that without such documents, the chancery court could not properly interpret, review, dissolve, or modify a trust without having the language of the trust before it.

Affirmed - 2020-CA-01282-COA (May 31, 2022)

Opinion by Judge Emfinger - Dissent by Judge McCarty

Hon. Mitchell M. Lundy Jr. (Panola County Chancery Court, First Judicial Dist.)

Taylor D. Buntin III for Appellant - A. E. (Rusty) Harlow Jr., Kathi Crestman Wilson, & Morgan Kay Jackson for Appellee

Briefed by [Dallas Martin](#)

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COURT OF APPEALS - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

TROTTER V. STATE

CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - ELEMENTS - To establish ineffective-assistance-of-counsel a claimant, must prove (1) his defense counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) his counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE - CONSTITUTIONALITY - Prisoners are entitled to relief under the PCR Act if they can demonstrate that their life-without-parole sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment which requires showing that, under application of the *Miller* factors, the offender's life-without-parole sentence is unconstitutional

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JUVENILE OFFENDERS - SENTENCING - A sentence of life without parole can be applied constitutionally to juveniles who fail to convince the sentencing authority that *Miller* considerations are sufficient to prohibit its application and the sentence is only unconstitutional absent consideration of the characteristics and circumstances unique to juvenile defendants

FACTS

In 2004, a grand jury returned an indictment against Leon Trotter and Alvin Pittman for murder. Trotter was also indicted for manufacturing marijuana. Pittman ultimately pled guilty to manslaughter. Before trial, Trotter was appointed an attorney by the circuit court, but Trotter hired new counsel, Joe Buchanan. On the night before Trotter's trial, Buchanan filed a motion to produce discovery as well as a request to produce discovery. At trial, the State called a law enforcement officer, a forensic expert, and Trotter's ex-girlfriend as witnesses in their case, and each testified to circumstances that suggested that Trotter was the shooter. Trotter was the sole witness in his defense, and he testified that Pittman was the shooter. Ultimately, the jury found Trotter guilty of murder as charged, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. After the denial of his post-trial motion, attorney Lisa Ross filed on Trotter's behalf, a motion for an out-of-time appeal. The court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed Trotter's conviction but permitted Trotter to raise his ineffective-assistance claim in post-conviction proceedings. In 2018, attorney Walter Boone filed on Trotter's behalf, a "Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing and/or Resentencing Hearing" in which they asserted that Trotter was entitled to a new trial based upon statements made by Pittman in an affidavit, that Trotter had received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that Trotter was entitled to resentencing under *Miller* because he was a juvenile when he was sentenced to life without eligibility for parole. The circuit court granted Trotter the evidentiary hearing and set it for August 2018. At the hearing, Trotter reiterated these three issues and brought several new witnesses to attempt to show that Trotter was not the killer. The State then called the same law enforcement officer as they did at trial, and his testimony was identical to his testimony at trial except he testified now that Trotter's trial attorney never interviewed him prior to the trial. The circuit court found that Trotter failed to show that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and denied Trotter's request to be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Trotter subsequently filed two motions which were each denied by the circuit court. Trotter appealed.

ISSUES

Whether the circuit court erred by (1) ruling that Trotter did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) denying Trotter's request to be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole.

HOLDING

(1) Because the evidence presented at the hearing did not establish that Pittman was the shooter, because even if it had, there was not a reasonable probability that a different result would have been reached at trial, and because evidence at the hearing failed to prove that Trotter's counsel's actions were deficient in the investigation of Trotter's case, the circuit court did not err by finding that Trotter failed to prove his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. (2) Because Trotter should have known that he had the burden of showing that he should be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole, was given the opportunity to show that his life-without-parole sentence was unconstitutional, but failed to do

so, because Trotter told the circuit court that it could decide as a matter of law, because there was no evidence presented at the hearing that his sentence should have been vacated and that he should have been resentenced to life with the possibility of parole, and because the circuit court evaluated the *Miller* factors based on the evidence before it but ultimately found them to be insufficient in prohibiting the sentence, the circuit court did not err in denying Trotter's request to be resentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Humphreys County Circuit Court.

Affirmed - 2020-CA-00094-COA (May 31, 2022)

Opinion by Judge Greenlee

Hon. Jannie M. Lewis-Blackmon (Humphreys County Circuit Court)

Walter H. Boone & Andy Lowry for Appellant - Barbara Wakeland Byrd (Att'y Gen. Office) for Appellee

Consolidated with:

Affirmed - 2005-KA-00379-COA (May 31, 2022)

Hon. Jannie M. Lewis-Blackmon (Humphreys County Circuit Court)

Walter H. Boone & Andy Lowry for Appellant - Barbara Wakeland Byrd (Att'y Gen. Office) for Appellee

Briefed by [Kelsey Davis](#)

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COURT OF APPEALS - CRIMINAL CASES

BLOCTON V. STATE

CRIMINAL - FELONY

EVIDENCE - HEARSAY - TENDER YEARS EXCEPTION - Under Miss. R. Evid. 803(25), a statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if (a) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability, and (b) the child either (1) testifies at the proceedings, or (2) is unavailable as a witness

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - BURDEN OF PROOF - A claimant of ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of proof to show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficiency prejudiced his defense; allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel must be made with specificity and detail, and are assessed by the totality of the circumstances

FACTS

While living in Gulfport, Clyde Blocton began to sexually abuse his five-year-old stepdaughter, K.L. Eventually, K.L. disclosed the abuse to her grandmother. After K.L.'s initial disclosure, Megan Morvant, a Gulfport Police Department Detective, was assigned to investigate K.L.'s allegations. In July of 2018, Morvant arranged a forensic interview for K.L. with forensic interviewer, Daniel Dooley. Based on his interview with K.L., Dooley determined that the interview with K.L. "was consistent with a sexual abuse disclosure." In October of 2018, Blocton was arrested on a warrant charging him with sexual battery. He was released from bond in November of 2018 under the condition that he had no contact with K.L. or her family. In the meantime, K.L.'s mother moved the family to Louisiana. In January of 2019, Ashley Meyers, a child protection investigator from Louisiana, received a report that expressed concern for a lack of supervision and inadequate shelter, including the possibility that K.L. was still residing with Blocton. Meyers conducted the investigation, finding that Blocton was still living with the family despite the bond restriction in place. K.L. was then removed from her mother's custody and placed in foster care. In January of 2019, K.L. was placed with Megan Sharp. A few days into her placement, K.L. disclosed to Sharp how Blocton had sexually abused her on multiple occasions. In June of 2019, Blocton was indicted on one count of sexual battery. In August of 2019, Blocton entered a plea of not guilty and the case proceeded to trial in January of 2021. Before trial, the circuit judge held a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of K.L.'s disclosures to Dooley and Sharp and to determine

whether K.L. was competent to testify at trial. The circuit judge found K.L. competent to testify at trial but reserved his ruling on the admissibility of K.L.'s disclosures to the others. After K.L. testified at trial, the circuit judge conducted another hearing outside the presence of the jury to rule on whether Dooley and Sharp could testify about K.L.'s disclosures to them. The circuit judge specifically addressed each reliability factor under Miss. R. Evid. 803(25) on the record and ruled that K.L.'s disclosures had substantial indicia of reliability and were admissible under the tender-years exception. Both Dooley and Sharp then testified regarding K.L.'s disclosures to them. Morvant also testified as to her investigation regarding K.L.'s sexual abuse allegations against Blocton. Blocton was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Blocton filed an unsuccessful motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Blocton appealed.

ISSUES

Whether (1) the State impermissibly bolstered K.L.'s testimony with the testimony of other witnesses and (2) the admission of Investigator Meyers's testimony violated Blocton's right to a fair trial.

HOLDING

(1) Because Blocton did not object to any alleged bolstering from the witnesses, Blocton's argument was procedurally barred; however, because K.L. testified at trial and was subjected to cross-examination, and because K.L.'s statements to the witnesses were all consistent with her initial disclosure despite being disclosed at different times, the circuit court acted within its discretion by concluding that K.L.'s out-of-court statements were supported by sufficient indicia of reliability. (2) Because there was no violation of a legal rule considered to be plain, clear, or obvious and prejudicial on the result of the trial, the admission of Investigator Meyers' testimony did not violate Blocton's right to a fair trial. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Harrison County Circuit Court.

Affirmed - 2021-KA-00197-COA (May 31, 2022)

Opinion by Judge Greenlee

Hon. Christopher Louis Schmidt (Harrison County Circuit Court, First Judicial Dist.)

W. Daniel Hinchcliff (Pub. Def. Office) for Appellant - Candice Leigh Rucker (Att'y Gen. Office) for Appellee

Briefed by [Regan Monk](#)

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